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Abstract 
This paper attempts to show that while fear of democracy turning into a ‘majoritarian’ 
system is rational, it is not always realistic because of the inherent inconsistencies in 
the idea of ‘community cohesion’. Traditional notion of community, constituted by 
oneness of race, religion, culture or caste, has been seriously contested by upsurge 
of ‘salad bowl’ multicultural societies comprising assortment of races, cultures and 
religions. Even as the trajectories of modern democracies appear to foreground the 
ethnicisation of its politics, it does not amount to a full-fledged ethnicisation of the 
communities at large. A thoroughly united community, if there is one, looks real only 
in the realm of imagination. 
Resumen 
Este documento intenta mostrar que si bien el miedo a que la democracia se convierta 
en un sistema "mayoritario" es racional, no siempre es realista debido a las 
inconsistencias inherentes a la idea de "cohesión comunitaria". La noción tradicional 
de comunidad, constituida por la unidad de raza, religión, cultura o casta, ha sido 
Artículos atravesados por (o cuestionando) la idea del sujeto -y su género- como una construcción psicobiológica de la cultura. 
Articles driven by (or questioning) the idea of the subject -and their gender- as a cultural psychobiological construction 
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seriamente cuestionada por el surgimiento de sociedades multiculturales de 
"ensaladera" que comprenden una variedad de razas, culturas y religiones. Aun 
cuando las trayectorias de las democracias modernas parecen poner en primer plano 
la etnicización de su política, no equivale a una etnicización completa de las 
comunidades en general. Una comunidad completamente unida, si hay una, parece 
real solo en el ámbito de la imaginación. 
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Introduction 
Reflections on democracy are laced with a hope that despite being rule 
by majority democracy will operate within certain philosophical and 
constitutional constraints that will not to allow it to violate the rights of 
minorities. Supporters of the democracy wax confident that since a 
system chosen and built by people themselves cannot become anti-
people, any aberration in the stated objective of democracy comes more 
as an exception than a rule. However, a sense of trepidation prevails, 
especially about the oft-encountered incapacity of democracy – 
parliamentary democracy in particular – to convert the rule of majority 
into the rule by consensus that is accommodative of minorities. When a 
democratic leadership begins to invoke majoritarian sentiment to get 
elected and harness the liberal institutions to further an anti-minority 
agenda, it is natural for the apprehensions over the litheness of 
democracy to arise. The electoral triumph of Donald Trump in US, 
Erdogan in Turkey and Narendra Modi in India is already broadening 
those apprehensions (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018).  
Democracy sustains in the vote of the majority population, and 
precisely for that reason, it spawns the threat of majority dominance in a 
society seething with racial, religious, and caste divides. What is one to 
do, for instance, if the majority wants an anti-minority legislation passed 
and votes a favorably inclined government to power to execute it, or the 
political executive starts exerting an undesirable influence on the 
democratic institutions to toe a particular ideological line?  
It is because of the propensity of the elected representatives to pander 
to their majority constituency that the questions are raised whether 
democracy is truly inclusive of minorities in the plural societies. A 
vociferous champion of representative democracy, John Stuart Mill 
advocated the need for proportional voting system to ensure the 
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protection of minority interests against the majoritarian tendencies in the 
democracy (Mill, 2010). Gandhi shared similar fears about the possible 
violation of minority representation in context of the proposed 
representative democracy in the independent India. Commenting on the 
representative democracy in Hind Swaraj in 1909, Gandhi wrote, “I pray 
to God that India may never be in that plight” (Gandhi cited Shankaran, 
2019). Gandhi’s love for democracy was restricted to his utopian belief in 
direct democracy where everybody could directly participate in the 
governance. And in this formulation, he came close to Rousseau who 
found the possibility of the ‘just and indestructible General Will’ in some 
sort of direct democracy (Rousseau, 1993). To Gandhi, representative 
democracy was not going to work in a multicultural country like India, 
and he tended to draw from Mill that “democracy was next to impossible 
in multi-ethnic societies and completely impossible in linguistically divided 
countries” (Mill cited in Lijphart, 1996).  
Multiculturalism is the mainstay of the contemporary societies. 
Ushered in by the waves of migration in an increasingly globalised world, 
linguistically and ethnically divided societies are a norm. That has given 
rise, among other things, to the rejuvenated debates about the political 
space that minorities should or should not occupy in the lands where 
they are not supposed to belong. The issue of minority rights has 
humungous social and cultural implications that the liberal structures 
of democratic governance are finding difficult to deal with. For example, 
granting special group rights to the minorities implies welcoming their 
separate ethnicity, culture and religion into the mainstream culture of 
the receiving country. What follows is perhaps the biggest dilemma of 
present-day democracy: what happens to the national unity of the 
country when you allow different ethnic, racial, religious peoples to live 
with different sets of rights in one country (Bloemraad et al., 2008)? The 
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contradictory political perspectives on how democracy should negotiate 
the question of ethnic divide have had both the social scientists and the 
policymakers deeply preoccupied everywhere. However, neither seems to 
provide a convincing answer.  
So, is Gandhi’s fear of representative democracy degenerating into 
anti-people institution coming true? Is the democracy in the country 
becoming majoritarian in such a way as to facilitate social and political 
exclusion of the minorities? Have the Indian minorities been reduced to 
what Lee (2001) calls the ‘persistent minorities’ who remain minorities, 
no matter how many times they vote and how many issues they vote on?  
 
Community Cohesion is Unrealistic 
This paper attempts to show while fear of democracy turning into a 
‘majoritarian’ system is rational, it is not always realistic because of the 
inherent inconsistencies in the idea of ‘community cohesion’. Traditional 
notion of community, constituted by oneness of race, religion, culture or 
caste, has been seriously contested by upsurge of ‘salad bowl’ 
multicultural societies comprising assortment of races, cultures and 
religions (Kymlicka & Bashir, 2008). Even as the trajectories of modern 
democracies appear to foreground the ethnicisation of its politics, it does 
not amount to a full-fledged ethnicisation of the communities at large. A 
thoroughly united community, if there is one, looks real only in the realm 
of imagination. 
Even normatively, the concept of majoritarian democracy, singularly 
dominated by a numerically superior community, looks logically flawed. 
Going by the way the democratic decision-making happens, one does not 
usually find individual interests coalescing into a collective interest. 
Suppose a person wants to buy a car and has an option of choosing from 
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two models: an expensive model that comes fitted with a pollution control 
equipment, and a cheaper model that is without such an equipment. In 
such a case, buyer is surely not going to pay more to own the expensive 
model just because it is good for environment. She will, as it were, end 
up buying the cheaper model even if she favours the pollution control 
measures in her individual capacity (Hardin, 1990). In other words, a 
person is focused more deeply on what benefits her individually than the 
collective benefits resulting from her actions.    
 
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem 
The roots of the argument that individual rankings do not get 
converted to collective ranking go back to public choice theory associated 
with Condorcet's ‘Problem of Cyclic Majorities’ and Kenneth Arrow's 
‘Impossibility Theorem’ (Sen, 1979). Public choice theory establishes in 
clear terms that democracy cannot just be a tool to incorporate majority 
opinions. Arrow’s Theorem is about the inadequacies of the voting 
systems and it posits that it is impossible to have fair elections using 
voter’s ranking preferences. Now, the three important conditions of this 
theorem in respect of democracy are: non-dictatorship, unanimity and 
independence of irrelevant alternatives. Arrow’s theorem says if there a 
voting system that collects votes based on ranked preferences of the 
individuals, then it has to violate at least one of the conditions of Theorem 
(Morreau, 2016). That is, in order to have best among the three existing 
conditions of theorem, the voting system should discard either one or 
both conditions. So, because dictatorship is no option in a democracy, 
the individual voter is likely to discard either unanimity or the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives, or both. Mostly, it is unanimity 
that becomes a sacrificial goat for the electoral process to avoid 
dictatorship. The logical corollary of this is what is also called the 
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‘favourite betrayal’, which means rather than voting for their most 
favourite candidate, people vote against their least favorite candidate. Of 
course, Arrow’s Theorem, as he himself admitted it, does not establish 
most voting systems work badly all the times, but the possibility that they 
can all work badly at times cannot be ruled out.    
Arrow’s Theorem at least hypothetically proves genuine democracy 
would be impossible under the present voting system, because no voting 
system, regardless of its efficiency and utility, can be true representative 
of the voters. Given this imperfectability, one might be tempted to ask 
whether having such a skewed voting system is good or bad for the 
democracy. Ironical it might sound; the fact is Arrow’s concern may 
actually make the democracy healthier in the ethnically divided societies 
by helping it dispense with its majoritarian hue. Since individual 
interests, in keeping with the postulations of the Theorem, do not 
aggregate to collective interests, the likelihood of the so-called absolute 
community coherence founded on the totality of racial, cultural or 
religious identities remains far from realisation. By way of an example in 
Indian context, the social and political behaviour of two prominent 
minorities –Dalit and Muslim– illustrates how the horizontal 
heterogeneity underlying the communities militates against the prevalent 
notion of their ethnic or cultural cohesion.  
 
Dalits and Muslims – A Myth of Community Cohesion 
Dalit community or Scheduled castes (SC) have been an integral part 
of Indian society since time immemorial. History records them as an 
oppressed group, suffering widespread ostracism and exploitation owing 
to its degraded social status. After Ambedkar launched the emancipatory 
movement for their entitlement, SCs managed to get the constitutional 
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guarantees in form of reservations in jobs and educational institutions in 
the independent India. Maharashtra state, for example, identifies 59 
castes as backward castes and places them in the category of SCs. The 
basis for bracketing them under one category is the similarity of their 
socioeconomic background. But then a closer look at their political 
perceptions and the social behaviour reveals certain contrasting facts. 
These castes, despite their outward similarities, consider themselves 
distinct from each other –often so distinct that they would neither inter–
dine nor intermarry. The distance they maintain from each other in 
several instances is almost akin to the distance the upper castes would 
traditionally maintain from the lower castes. Studies show that rather 
than come together as a cohesive group for a greater equality, they tend 
to begrudge the fact that the better placed categories within SCs eat into 
what rightfully belongs to them, and thus deprive them of the benefits of 
the welfare programs of the state. For instance, Matang –a prominent 
Maharashtrian category of the Scheduled Castes after Mahar– feel 
disadvantaged because their numerically superior counterparts –mostly 
Mahar– within the SCs are seen as decamping with a larger share of the 
pie (Waghmare, 2010). 
The case of Muslim community is even more complex. There is a strong 
perception that Muslims constitute a monolithic social category. They are 
assumed to live in a close-knit environment with the instrument of fatwa 
vertically hierarchizing their political decision-making. Such popular 
perceptions about Muslims also translate to a biased political perspective 
about them. Muslims are supposed to vote in bloc, vote only for certain 
parties, and vote strategically to defeat certain parties. The fact is these 
perceptions are at best misperceptions and at worst symptomatic of 
ethnic profiling (Verma & Gupta, 2016). Studies show there are serious 
internal divisions within the Muslims that neutralise the counterclaim of 
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Muslims being monolith. For instance, there has been prevalence of caste 
among Muslims for long, notwithstanding all-round denial of it by the 
elitist leadership within the community. 1901 Census mentions 133 low 
castes amongst Muslims with some of them being so low that ‘no other 
Muhammadan would associate with them, and who are forbidden to 
enter the mosque or to use the public burial ground’ (Fazl, 2006). Even 
in politics, “the election data show Muslim support to political parties was 
never constant” (Shakir, 1990). As for Muslims turning out in huge 
numbers to vote in masse for particular parties, data from 2004 Lok 
Sabha elections reveal the turnout among Muslims was lower than the 
national average in those elections. In fact, in four elections before 2004, 
the Muslim turnout was 59% as against the national average of 60% 
(Patra, 2006). All this shows Muslim community may not be as cohesive 
as it is projected in the popular fancies.   
But if that is the case, one might ask whether the imperfect voting 
system leading to a truncated democracy does away altogether with the 
threats –both real and perceived– to the minorities in an ethnically 
divided society. It may not. Democracy does harbour prejudices of the 
majority that often show in its priviledging the numerically superior 
chunk of the people. Often beneath the pervasive incidence of poverty 
affecting the Dalit and Muslim population in India, what lurks glaringly 
is widespread social exclusion grounded in the multiple prejudices 
(Borooah et al., 2015).  
Having said that, it is also important to underline there can never be 
persistent majority or minority because the communities in reality are 
never a well-knit mass of people. It is true that political communities are 
founded on certain identities – common culture, ethnicity, religion or 
caste – with members drawing their personal identity from the larger 
community identity and taking pride in flaunting it. Beyond this, 
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however, there are grey areas. It is equally true that a community is also 
a disintegrated conglomerate of divergent constituents, each of which 
thinks and acts differently from the others. What might appear distinctly 
cohesive unit from outside might embed gaping fissures inside that may 
not be easily perceptible, but do exist. People perceived to think along the 
similar lines due to their social, cultural or economic affiliations may 
actually not see eye to eye with fellow-members on several critical issues. 
Similarity of affiliation does not make people similar in their ideas. They 
can vastly differ in their views from their seemingly similar counterparts 
within the same cultural, ethnic or religious grouping. 
This propensity to divergence – obvious in two minority communities 
in India – obtains in the majority community as well. The fact is majority 
community is even more divergent. An analysis of electoral outcomes in 
India in recent years makes it amply clear. For example, since 2014 most 
members of majority community have been reported to have voted for 
Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) in parliamentary elections, but when it came 
to elections to state assemblies, they did not vote for the party with as 
much enthusiasm. That is why despite winning two parliamentary 
elections with thumping majority since 2014, BJP has put in a poor 
performance in the states. Now, in terms of Hindu voters preferring BJP, 
several commentators have argued that majority voters’ predilection to 
BJP was an endorsement of party’s explicit Hindutva ideology. That 
argument begins to look defective because if a voter had indeed voted for 
an ideology in one election, she should have continued voting for it in the 
other, given that the penchant for ideology should circumvent the 
consideration of whether the party has fielded suitable candidates or 
brought out an appealing manifesto. There is a journalistic hypothesis 
that if two elections occur with a span of six months, one gets to see an 
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identical voting pattern in both. But the Indian voters have proved that 
hypothesis wrong in last six years. 
 
Conclusion 
It is difficult to see how any community can achieve a perfect similarity 
of interests. Occupational patterns, linguistic preferences, regional 
differences, and the motley religious beliefs make the members within 
one community starkly different from others. To say ethnic identity 
invariably gets preferentially treated is to overlook the other 
differentiating indicators that are no less important. In majority cases, 
when people go to polling booths, they carry multiple issues with them 
that determine who they will vote for. Mostly, these issues are those of 
bread and butter, and sometimes also of identity, but identity surfaces 
only when there is competitive polarisation. Since competitive 
polarisation is not perennial to any society, there is a hope for the 
democracy to be simply humanitarian without being either overtly 
majoritarian or openly minoritarian.  
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